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INTRODUCTION 
The Industrial Commission of Utah hereby responds to 
Petitioner Warren Hosking's petition for review of the 
Industrial Commission's order denying Mr. Hoskings' claim for 
permanent total disability compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq; "the Act" 
hereafter). 
The Industrial Commission generally agrees with the 
arguments set forth in the brief filed by respondent Salt Lake 
City Corporation. The Industrial Commission will therefore 
limit its argument to one issue: Is there substantial evidence 
in support of the Industrial Commission's finding that other 
work is available to Mr. Hoskings that is within his 
capabilities. 
JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1995), the 
Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over petitions 
for review of the Industrial Commission's final orders. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The ultimate issue in this case is whether Mr. Hoskings is 
entitled to permanent total disability compensation pursuant to 
§35-1-67 of the Act, as a result of his 1986 industrial 
accident. The subsidiary issue which the Industrial 
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Commission believes to be dispositive of Mr. Hoskings7 claim is 
as follows: Is other work available to Mr. Hoskings that is 
within his capabilities. This is a question of fact. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §63 -46b-16 (4) (g) (1993 Repl. volume), the 
Court shall grant relief to Hoskings if the Industrial 
Commission's decision "is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court. "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that will convince a reasonable 
mind to support a conclusion. Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Because Mr. Hoskings' industrial injury occurred during 
September, 1986, his claim for permanent total disability 
compensation is governed by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, Replacement 
Volume 4B, 1974; 1987 Cumulative Supp.), set forth in Appendix 
1, attached hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Industrial Commission agrees with the description of 
the nature of this case, course of proceedings and disposition 
below found in the briefs of Mr. Hoskings and Salt Lake City. 
With respect to the facts of this case, the Industrial 
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Commission adopts the statement of facts set forth in Salt Lake 
City's brief. 
I SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Mr. Hoskings 
suffered an injury in the line of duty that has left him with a 
permanent impairment. Without minimizing Mr. Hoskings' injury, 
the Industrial Commission has concluded that the injury has not 
left Mr. Hoskings permanently and totally disabled within the 
meaning of §67 of the Act because other work is available for 
Mr. Hoskings. 
When viewed in light of the record as a whole, substantial 
evidence supports the Industrial Commission's finding of "other 
available work". 
After Mr. Hoskings' claim for permanent total disability 
claim is resolved in this proceeding, he can renew his claim for 
permanent partial disability compensation. 
I ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AS 
INTERPRETED BY UTAH'S APPELLATE COURTS, THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION MUST DENY MR. HOSKINGS' CLAIM FOR PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION IP OTHER WORK IS 
AVAILABLE TO HIM. 
The Utah Supreme has described the principles underlying 
permanent total disability compensation as authorized by the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act: 
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At the outset, we note that the purpose of the 
worker's compensation acts is "to secure workmen . . 
. against becoming objects of charity, by making 
reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to 
the employment . . . ." (Citation omitted) This 
compensation is not in the form of damages for injury, 
as in a tort action, but in the form of payments to 
compensate for the loss of employability resulting 
from the injury. (Citation omitted.) Marshall v. 
Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208, 210 (Utah 1984) . 
Also in Marshall, ibid., the Utah Supreme Court identified 
a step-by-step analysis for determining whether an injured 
worker is entitled to permanent total disability compensation. 
The final step requires a determination of whether work is 
available to the injured worker that is within his capabilities: 
Once the employee has demonstrated his 
impairment and presented evidence that he is no longer 
capable of performing his former work and that he 
cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the 
employer to show that regular work is available. 
Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212. 
In judging whether regular work is available, the 
Industrial Commission must "take into account the plaintiff's 
education, mental capacity and age." Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv 
Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah 1986), citing 
Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212. 
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POINT II: SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT OTHER WORK IS 
AVAILABLE FOR MR. HOSKINGS. 
As noted above and as reflected in the Industrial 
Commission's decision, set forth as Appendix 2, the burden of 
proof is on Salt Lake City to show that regular work is 
available to Mr. Hoskings, taking into account his personal 
characteristics and limitations. 
The record shows Mr. Hoskings to be an intelligent man 
with a substantial educational background, both of a technical 
and academic nature. Mr. Hoskings has an abundance of work 
related skills, derived from his employment in the electronics 
industry, his employment as a firefighter, and his service in 
the National Guard. He has demonstrated personal qualities as 
an employee that caused him to advance through the ranks of the 
Salt Lake City Fire Department to the position of captain. As 
a trained, intelligent, and versatile employee, Mr. Hoskings can 
reasonably expect favorable consideration in the labor market. 
The record also shows that from the time of injury until 
his retirement, Mr. Hoskings did not miss any time from work 
because of his injury. That Mr. Hoskings continued to work is 
not controlling on the issue of his permanent total disability. 
Norton v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) . It 
is, however, some evidence of his capacity for work. 
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Similarly, the fact that Mr. Hoskings retired from his 
employment with Salt Lake City does not prevent him from 
qualifying for workers' compensation benefits. Peck v. Eimco, 
748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987). However, it is some evidence of Mr. 
Hoskings7 ability to work that he did not apply for a disability 
retirement. Instead, he continued to work until early 
retirement incentives were made available as part of Salt Lake 
City's regular retirement program. 
Additional evidence of Mr. Hoskings' ability to find work 
is the fact that he was employed by Hamilton Stores. He worked 
on a full time basis during the summer months without any 
difficulties. However, when Hamilton Stores offered year around 
employment to Mr. Hoskings, he resigned. Again, Mr. Hoskings' 
work at Hamilton Stores is evidence that work is available for 
him. 
Finally, the record contains the report of Intracorp, a 
professional vocational consulting group. The report contains 
an accurate account of Mr. Hoskings' personal characteristics, 
education and work experience. It evaluates the Utah job market 
for persons with Mr. Hoskings' qualifications and limitations 
and identifies several job classifications with current openings 
that Mr. Hoskings could perform. Additionally, it identified 
other employment Mr. Hoskings could be trained to perform. 
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The foregoing evidence, when taken together, constitutes 
substantial evidence that despite Mr. Hoskings' disability, 
there is available work he can do, "without the expectation that 
he will rely on the sympathy of friends or his own 'superhuman 
efforts.'" Marshall, 681 P.2d. at 212. 
POINT Ills MR. HOSKINGS STILL CAN CLAIM PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION. 
In his initial application for hearing, Mr. Hoskings 
claimed permanent partial disability compensation and permanent 
total disability compensation. Such claims are necessarily made 
in the alternative. As Mr. Hoskings' claim proceeded through 
the Industrial Commission, it was the claim for permanent total 
disability compensation that was adjudicated and which is the 
subject of this petition for review. 
In the event that the Court affirms the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Mr. Hoskings is not entitled to 
permanent total disability compensation, Mr. Hoskings is 
entitled to reinstate his claim for permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the view of the Industrial Commission, the evidence in 
this proceeding establishes that despite his disabilities, Mr. 
Hoskings has experience, skills and abilities for which 
employment is available. Consequently, under the standards set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Marshall v. Industrial 
Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984) and other appellate 
decisions, Mr. Hoskings is not permanently and totally disabled 
within the meaning of §67 of the Act. 
Dated this ~ZC\\\<\ day of September, 1995. 
AV-U-t-UA 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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Appendix One 
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-67 
Replacement Vol. 4B, 1974, Cumulative Supp. 1987.Two 
35-1-67 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure 
and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a depen-
dent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings 
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of 
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed 
$1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabili-
tation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice appli-
cable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having com-
bined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabil-
itation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662/a% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with 
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or 
refdses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this 
section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to bene-
fits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those 
injured prior to March 6,1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when 
paid only by the second iiyury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division ofvocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the em-
ployee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-67 
qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee 
has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, 
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of 
this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required 
in those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation 
effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch, 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943,42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65,5 1; 1949, ch. 
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957, ch. 62, $ 1; 1959, ch. 55, $ 1; 1961, ch. 
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86t § 5; 1971, ch. 
76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13, § 1; 
1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, § 1; 1977, 
ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, $ 6; 1979, ch. 138, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 356, § 1; 
1985, ch. 160, $ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment 
substituted "85% of the state average weekly 
wage" for "662/3% of the state average weekly 
wage" four times in the first paragraph and 
once in the last paragraph; increased the mini-
mum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the 
first paragraph; inserted "not to exceed the av-
erage weekly wage of the employee at the time 
of the injury" twice in the first paragraph; in-
creased the benefit per week from $50 to $60 at 
the end of the third paragraph (deleted by the 
1977 amendment) and near the end of the 
fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment); and substituted "July 1,1975" for "July 
1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by 
the 1977 amendment). 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substi-
tuted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph. 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; combined the first two paragraphs 
into one paragraph; inserted the second para-
graph; and deleted the former third and fourth 
paragraphs which read: "Commencing July 1, 
1971, all persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and on that date or prior 
thereto were receiving compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits 
at the rate of $60 per week. 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who 
were permanently and totally disabled on or 
before March 5,1949, and were receiving com-
pensation benefits and continue to receive such 
benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) at a rate sufficient to bring their 
weekly benefit to $60 when combined with em-
ployer or insurance carrier compensation pay-
ments." 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the 
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substi-
tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and substi-
tuted "$75" for "$60." 
The 1979 amendment increased the mini-
mum benefit in the second paragraph from $75 
to $85. 
The 1981 amendment substituted "second in-
jury fund" for "special fund" throughout the 
section; and increased the amount in the sec-
ond paragraph from $85 to $100. 
The 1983 amendment substituted "under 
this section" at the end of the first paragraph 
for "as set forth herein"; increased the mini-
mum amount in the first sentence of the second 
paragraph from $100 to $110; and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1985 amendment substituted "$120" for 
"$110" in the first sentence of the second para-
graph. 
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon 
approval by the governor, or the day following 
the constitutional time limit of Article VII, 
Sec 8 without the governor's signature, or in 
the case of a veto, the date of veto override." 
Approved March 18, 1985. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Decision of The Industrial Commission of Utah 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
WARREN HOSKINGS, * 
* ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
vs. * 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, * 
* 
Defendant. * Case No. 90-0401 
1
 Salt Lake City Corporation asks The Industrial Commission of 
Utah to review an Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding 
permanent total disability compensation to Warren Hoskings under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
I 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46*3-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Beginning in 1966, Mr. Hoskings worked for Salt Lake City as 
a fireman. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1974, then captain in 
the early 1980's. 
While fighting a fire in 1980, Mr. Hoskings injured his left 
ankle. He underwent surgery, but continued to experience pain. On 
April 6, 1986, in the course of his employment, he reinjured his 
left ankle. He received medical attention the next day and was 
diagnosed with an acute ankle sprain and "calcaneus/cuboid joint 
problem," later additionally diagnosed as "traumatic 
osteoarthritis". 
Mr. Hoskings did not miss any work as a result of the April 
1986 injury. However, he experienced chronic pain and difficulty 
walking. He was examined by a number of different physicians who 
attempted various conservative remedies without producing any 
signif icant improvement. 
| On September 1, 1988, Mr. Hoskings accepted early retirement 
from Salt Lake City. There is no indication that Mr. Hoskings' 
work performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement, nor is 
there any evidence Mr, Hoskings informed Salt Lake City that his 
decision to retire was related to his ankle injury. However, Mr. 
Hoskings now claims that his decision to retire was motivated by 
his ankle injury. 
Q O 3 ^ 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
WARREN HOSKINGS 
PAGE THREE 
While the Industrial Commission agrees with the analytical 
framework applied by the ALJ to Mr. Hoskings' claim, the Industrial 
Commission does not agree with the ALJ's conclusions on two points: 
First, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Second, the Industrial Commission finds that other 
work is available that Mr. Hoskings can perform, despite his ankle 
injury. 
On the issue of Mr. Hoskings' ability to be rehabilitated, the 
Industrial Commission has carefully reviewed the DRS report, which 
concludes that Mr. Hoskings was "unable to demonstrate the stamina 
and endurance needed to work in full-time employment." However, 
the report makes no distinction between sedentary work and more 
strenuous employment. It does not address the fact that Mr. 
Hoskings' employment at Hamilton Stores demonstrated some ability 
to work. It makes no reference to Mr. Hoskings' intelligence, 
education, adaptability, or wide range of prior work experience. 
The Industrial Commission has also reviewed the deposition of Mr. 
Miera, a rehabilitation counselor with DRS, but Mr. Miera's 
testimony adds little to support the DRS report. 
In contrast to the DRS report, the Intracorp report identifies 
Mr. Hoskings' training, experience and abilities. It specifically 
addresses the effects of Mr. Hoskings' ankle injury and other 
medical conditions. The Intracorp report then analyzes the 
foregoing factors and concludes that Mr. Hoskings can be 
rehabilitated. Intracorp's conclusion is corroborated by the fact 
that Mr. Hoskings found other work at Hamilton Stores and 
successfully performed his employment duties there. The Industrial 
Commission is persuaded by Intracorp's objective data and 
subjective analysis. 
Although Mr. Hoskings can be rehabilitated and therefore fails 
to meet the second element of the odd lot doctrine, the Industrial 
Commission will consider the third element of the odd lot doctrine. 
This third element requires Salt Lake City to show that other work 
is available to Mr. Hoskings. 
The Intracorp report contains a detailed list and discussion 
of employment opportunities within Mr. Hoskings' abilities. Such 
employment opportunities exist primarily in the Salt Lake 
metropolitan area, but also are present throughout Utah. The 
record contains no significant evidence contradicting the Intracorp 
report on this point. Consequently, the Industrial Commission 
finds that regular, dependable employment is available within Mr. 
Hoskings' abilities. 
GO^?.^ 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
WARREN HOSKINGS 
PAGE FOUR 
In summary, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ that 
Mr. Hoskings' industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that 
he cannot return to work as a fire fighter. However, contrary to 
the ALJ's decision, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. 
Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that regular, dependable work is 
available to him in other branches of the labor market. The 
Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Hoskings is not 
entitled to permanent total disability compensation within the 
meaning of §35-1-67 of the Utah Workers7 Compensation Act. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Mr. 
Hoskings is not entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation, it is unnecessary to address Mr. Hoskings7 argument 
regarding the date on which compensation should begin. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission reverses the ALJ's decision in this 
matter and hereby denies Mr. Hoskings claim for permanent total 
disability compensation. It is so ordered. 
Dated this3^^day of March, 1995. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order, Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 30 day£ of the date of this 
Order. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
WARREN HOSKINGS 
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